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Abstract—Globalization of IC manufacturing has led to in-
creased security concerns, notably IP theft. Several logic locking
techniques have been developed for protecting designs, but they
typically display very large overhead, and are generally suscepti-
ble to deciphering attacks. In this paper, we propose latch-based
logic locking, which manipulates both the flow of data and logic
in the design. This method converts an interconnected subset of
existing flip-flops to pairs of latches with programmable phase. In
tandem, decoy latches and logic are added, inhibiting an attacker
from determining the actual design functionality. To validate
this technique, we developed and verified a locking insertion
flow, analyzed PPA and ATPG overhead on benchmark circuits
and industry cores, extended existing attacks to account for the
technique, and taped out a demonstration chip. Importantly, we
show that the design overhead with this approach is significantly
less than with previous logic locking schemes, while resisting
model checker-based, oracle-driven attacks. With minimal delay
overhead, large numbers of decoy latches can be added, cheaply
increasing attack resistance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Due to prohibitively high research and development costs,
only a few foundries are manufacturing integrated circuits
(ICs) in advanced technology nodes. Consequently, many
IC companies tend to operate fabless, relying on untrusted
foundries to manufacture their designs. Once a circuit is sent for
fabrication, the foundry gains full visibility of the intellectual
property (IP) in netlist form with minimal effort, allowing IP
theft. This threat undermines the significant cost associated
with developing digital circuits and is a growing concern in
the IC industry [1].
To combat IP theft, a variety of logic locking techniques have
been developed. These techniques add programmable elements
to the logic of a circuit. When programmed incorrectly, the
elements disrupt the functionality of the circuit, obfuscating the
true design. The key, which correctly programs the elements,
is stored in an on-chip, tamper-proof memory. This key is
set post-manufacturing, so the correct functionality is never
revealed to the untrusted foundry [2].
Early examples of logic locking techniques insert keyed
XOR and MUX gates to corrupt the next-state logic [3], [4].
Unfortunately, these methods have been largely broken using
a variety of methods, the most successful of which are SAT-
based attacks [5]. Researchers have attempted to increase the
difficulty of mounting a SAT-based attack by inserting SAT-
resilient logic blocks into the locked circuit [6], [7]. These
techniques reduce the number of keys ruled out per attack
iteration, significantly increasing the overall execution time;
however, the logic blocks are susceptible to removal attacks
since the circuitry is typically traceable through properties such
as signal probability [8].
Other schemes rely on circuit properties that the SAT-based
attack does not model. For instance, the Cyclic Obfuscation
scheme assumes SAT solvers can only handle acyclic circuits
[9]. It creates loops in the circuit’s combinational logic
to corrupt the SAT-based attack. Another technique, Delay
Locking, adds tunable delay key gates to the design. Incorrect
keys lead to setup and hold timing violations that SAT solvers
cannot model by default. This comes at the cost of large delay
overheads as the security scales, with an average delay overhead
of 60% at their highest security level [10]. While the security of
these defenses initially seems promising, when their properties
are correctly formulated within SAT, they can be easily broken
[11], [12].
Yet another class of locking mechanisms is sequential logic
locking. One such technique modifies the circuit’s finite state
machine (FSM) to require a specific input sequence to transition
from the reset state to the functionally correct set of states
[13]. If an incorrect sequence is given, the circuit remains in
a portion of the FSM with incorrect behavior. This particular
scheme is susceptible to a targeted removal attack [14], [15]. In
general, sequential logic locking relies on limited scan access
to a design. However, recent work has extended the SAT-based
attack, originally developed for combinational circuits, into a
model checker-based attack that assumes no scan chain access
[16], [17].
In this paper, we propose a novel logic locking mechanism,
namely the addition of programmable phase latches within the
design. The latches enable the obfuscation of functionality
on multiple levels: manipulating the size and location of
the circuit’s state, corrupting of the circuit’s timing behavior,
and adding decoy logic. Our analysis shows that latch-based
logic locking is SAT/model checker-based attack resistant and
requires minimal overhead, enabling large amounts of insertion.
The contributions of this work are the following:
• Introduction of latch-based logic locking, a locking
technique that operates via manipulation of the phase
of sequential elements
• A design flow for latch-based logic locking, leveraging
the existing commercial synthesis tools
• Evidence of small design overhead for a set of industrial
cores and benchmark circuits from synthesis runs as well
as taped out place and route runs
• Comprehensive attack modeling of locking properties
including reset, cycle delay, timing, and loop breaking
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constraints
• Demonstration of resistance to current model checker-
based attacks
II. BACKGROUND
A. Attacker Model
In the characterization of the security of a locking technique,
an attacker model is used to specify assumptions regarding the
adversary’s ability. In this paper, we assume that the adversary
has access to three artifacts: the locked circuit’s netlist, the
timing information of the netlist, and an unlocked version of the
circuit with the correct key set inside the tamper-proof memory.
This unlocked circuit is referred to as the oracle. This model
corresponds to a foundry that has netlist and timing information
from a GDSII file and an unlocked circuit purchased on the
open market. While we maintain the use of scan chains in
the design, we assume that they have been disabled through
use of a fuse mechanism. The implementation of fuses has
been previously demonstrated and widely used in practice [18],
[19]. While additional side channel techniques may augment an
attacker’s capabilities [20], we consider these to be outside the
scope of the paper. This attacker model enables the mounting
of a model checker-based attack described in Section II-C;
however, we first describe its combinational equivalent, the
SAT-based attack, in Section II-B.
B. SAT-Based Attack
This attack uses the netlist and oracle to iteratively produce
correct input-output (IO) relationships [5]. These relationships
rule out all keys that do not produce the same behavior,
narrowing the space of possible circuit functionalities. The
IO relationships are efficiently learned through a three step
procedure: I. First, a miter circuit is used to determine inputs
that are guaranteed to rule out at least a single key per oracle
query. A miter circuit consists of two copies of the original
circuit with the inputs tied together, the key inputs kept separate,
and the outputs of each connected to comparators. A diagram of
the connections is shown in Fig. 1a. Additional key constraints,
such as timing and loop breaking, can be conjuncted with the
miter output. A SAT solver is used to find values of the shared
input and keys such that the output of the miter circuit is logic
1. By construction, the solution to the SAT problem will have
two different keys applied. The shared input value found by
the solver is termed a differentiating input (DI). II. Next, as
depicted in Fig. 1b, the learned DI is applied to the oracle
circuit to determine the differentiating output (DO), forming
an IO pair that the correct key must respect. III. Finally, as
shown in Fig. 1c, the input and output pair is added as a
constraint to the miter circuit. Now, any keys that satisfy the
miter circuit will also satisfy the learned IO relationship. While
each relationship is guaranteed to rule out at least one key, in
practice, a larger portion of the key space is ruled out. These
steps repeat until the miter circuit formulation is unsatisfiable.
At this point, any key that respects all learned IO relationships
will be a functionally correct key.
Fig. 1: SAT-based attack steps: (a) Miter circuit construction consisting
of two copies of the original circuit’s logic (C), (b) Unlocked circuit
(oracle) produces correct IO functionality (c) Addition of learned IO
constraint to miter circuit
C. Model Checker-Based Attack
The sequential version of the SAT-based attack uses the
same oracle and miter circuit, but extends the concept of a DI
to a differentiating input sequence (DIS). To handle the state
elements in the design, this attack substitutes the SAT solver
for a model checker. The model checker is able to unroll the
circuit in time, connecting the state input of one cycle to the
state output of the next. Every input sequence is assumed to
start from a potentially unknown, but fixed reset state. In the
same fashion as the SAT-based attack, a miter circuit is used to
find DISs that produce different output sequences for different
keys. These DISs are applied to the oracle and the produced
outputs form IO relationships which are again encoded into the
miter circuit as unrolled constraints. Aside from the reduced
controllability and observability from the state elements, the
most significant difference between the SAT-based and model
checker-based attacks is in the termination conditions. While
SAT solvers typically can exhaustively prove that no input can
satisfy the miter circuit, this is a much harder task for the
model checker due to the state space explosion associated with
allowing the model checker to unroll the circuit indefinitely.
Thus, the model checker attack relies on secondary termination
conditions: a check that only one key remains and a logical
equivalence check for the combinational logic fan-in into each
flip-flop. For a more complete description of the model checker-
based attack, we direct the reader to [16], [17].
D. Latch-Based Design and Retiming
Latches are level-sensitive sequential elements that are
transparent when the clock input is logic 1 and hold a sampled
value when the clock is logic 0. A typical master-slave flip-flop
contains two latches: a master latch with an inverted clock
phase followed by a slave latch with nominal clock phase.
When the clock is high, a sampled value from the last clock
cycle is held by the master latch and loaded into the slave.
When the clock is low, the slave latch maintains this sampled
value, while the master loads a new sample. Together, the
Fig. 2: Example of path with programmable phase latches (LAT), flip-
flops (FF) and combinational logic (CL). Both the physical hardware
and functional model are shown. Depending on the key setting, the
cycle and propagation delays are changed.
latches create an edge-triggered flip-flop, propagating the input
data to the output on the rising edge of the clock.
Through a set of transformations known as retiming, these
latches can be separated into individual gates and moved
through the fixed logic of a circuit [21], [22]. A functionally
correct retiming will maintain the cycle delay of every path
through the latches. Cycle delay is defined as the number of
required clock cycles for data to propagate along a path. Thus,
all paths through the original flip-flop maintain a cycle delay
of 1, passing through an inverted phase latch, then a nominal
phase latch. Latch retiming is used to reduce the critical path of
a design, shifting the amount path delay between the positive
and negative phase of the clock, as well as reduce area by
merging latches. The level sensitivity of latches enables cycle
sharing between the positive and negative phases of the clock
cycle allowing more flexible signal arrival times. This property
is often exploited in designs with tight timing constraints [23],
[24]. In this work, we use the flexible arrival time to increase
the modeling difficulty of an obfuscated circuit.
III. LATCH-BASED LOGIC LOCKING
In developing a locking system, we consider maintaining
circuit frequency a topmost priority. Toward this goal, we utilize
latches to lock a circuit via two mechanisms: programmable
path delay and programmable logic. This creates a locking
system in which the critical path logic can be obfuscated while
remaining largely unmodified. Both mechanisms employ decoy
latch elements to cheaply create uncertainty as to the circuit’s
correct function.
A. Programmable Path Delay Decoys
As shown in Fig. 2, a phase-programmable latch can be
created using a key to selectively feed a latch a nominal or
inverted phase clock. The latches either replace existing flip-
flops or are inserted as decoys on nets within the existing
combinational logic. Replacing flip-flops from the original
design can actually decrease the minimum clock period due to
cycle sharing. If the phase of a decoy latch is picked such that
the latch is clear during transitions on its input, the additional
propagation delay is minimal, roughly the delay of 2 inverters.
Depending on the key setting, these phase-programmable
latches can manipulate both the cycle delay and propagation
delay along a path, thereby changing the functionality of the
design via two mechanisms. Propagation delay is defined as
the amount of time necessary for a signal to travel from its
launching point to capturing point. An incorrect cycle delay
will change the logical behavior of the design whereas an
incorrect propagation delay will cause timing violations and
undetermined behavior. The pair of latches in Fig. 2 can be
set to four unique functionalities: a positive edge flip-flop
(10), a negative edge flip-flop (01), a combinational path
with propagation delay increased by a half-cycle (11), and
the combinational path with no added propagation delay (00).
As shown in Fig. 3, path delay decoy latches (orange) can be
inserted along paths in the original combinational logic of a
circuit.
Along with their low delay impact, latches are well suited
for obfuscating a circuit’s path delays due to their increased
complexity in modeling as compared to edge-triggered elements.
Both the cycle and propagation delay added by each latch are
a function of the phase of the upstream latches along a given
path, thus increasing the computation required to characterize a
given key setting. Additionally, because signals can be launched
from the latch at any point within its clear phase, checking
whether all signals are legally timed under a given key becomes
significantly more challenging. We expand on the utility of
both these properties in Section IV. In summary, the reasons
that make latches hard to design are the same that allow us to
utilize them as a source of obfuscation.
B. Programmable Logic Decoys
In conjunction with the manipulation of delays in the circuit,
we can add decoy logic within the design to create uncertainty
in the functions being computed. Keying the reset pin of the
phase-programmable latches, creates a simple method of adding
decoy logic. Additional latches are inserted in the design, each
along with a fan-in cone of decoy logic. The latch output is
combined with existing logic such that the functionality is not
changed if the latch output is logic 0. When the correct key is
applied to the circuit, the reset pin is forced to logic 1, thus
maintaining the intended function. Example logic decoys and
corresponding logic are shown in Fig. 3, highlighted in red.
The added programmable logic also allows flexible insertion
of latch-based logic locking. Circuits with sparse interconnec-
tion can be augmented to increase the amount of paths through
the locked portion. Structures known to be harder to resolve,
such as reconvergent fan-out and sequential feedback paths, can
be selectively added within this additional logic. Importantly,
Fig. 3: Conceptual view of latch-based logic locking. A set of
interconnected flip-flops is converted to programmable latches with
added decoy latches and logic. Each latch can operate on either clock
phase, hold clear, or output constant logic 0.
these modifications can be added while leaving the critical
path of the design unchanged.
Adding this additional key state requires an extra bit for
each latch. We can make use of all four states by adding a clear
mode in which the latch is held open, fixing the clock input to
logic 1. This additional state can help reduce insertion overhead
and concurrently increase the difficulty of modeling the system.
Now the added cycle and propagation delays depend on any
upstream latch, not just the immediate fan-in latches. This
locking technique forces the adversary to determine for each
latch whether it is a positive phase latch, negative phase
latch, delay decoy, or logic decoy.
C. Insertion Flow
I. The first step of the insertion flow is the selection of a set
of interconnected flip-flops within the original netlist. When
converted to phase-programmable latches, the ideal set of flip-
flops will have many possible functional states that are also
hard to rule out. Many possible functional states corresponds
to a set of flip-flops with many paths through the group; more
interconnections will create more unique paths. Additionally,
we would like to minimize the controllability and observability
into the group, thereby making each scenario harder to rule
out. Typically, this corresponds to fewer paths in and out of
the group. This task can be naturally modeled as community
finding in graphs. We adopt a flow-based community finding
algorithm to produce appropriately sized groups [25]. From a
sample of these groups, the group with the lowest cumulative
delay is selected, allowing low overhead for decoy insertion.
II. The selected group of flip-flops is subsequently converted
into latches and retimed. Standard synthesis tools do not support
latch retiming, however their ability to retime flip-flops can be
leveraged with a previously established procedure [21], [26].
First, each latch of the original flip-flop is replaced by a flip-
flop, depicted in Fig. 4a-b. Then, the flip-flops representing
the positive phase latches are held fixed, while the flip-flops
Fig. 4: Flip-flop to latch conversion and decoy addition. A flip-flop
is duplicated, retimed, and converted to latches. Two types of decoy
latches can be added to the paths in the fan-in and fan-out cones of
the latches. This example shows a single flip-flop, however in practice
an interconnected group is converted.
Key0 Key1 R CLK
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 CLK
1 0 0 !CLK
1 1 0 1
Fig. 5 & TABLE I: Diagram and truth table of latch clock and reset
control signals. Control circuitry (CC) which determines the latch
function is connected to the clock and reset pins. The truth table’s
row colors correspond to the associated latch type.
representing negative phase latches are retimed. This is then
repeated, fixing the negative phase latches and retiming the
positive, shown in Fig. 4b-c. These flip-flops are then replaced
by their respective latch counterparts, depicted in Fig. 4c-d.
III. Next, as shown in Fig. 4d, the two types of decoy latches
are inserted into the collective fan-out and fan-in cone of the
group. Path delay decoys are randomly inserted on nodes with
slack greater than the delay through a clear latch. To add logic
decoys, cones of random logic driven by subsets of the latches
are created. These cones are connected to a latch which fans
out to another subset of the latches. The fan-out logic is created
such that if the latch is controlled to constant logic 0 through
the reset pin, there will be no effect on the downstream original
logic.
IV. Finally, as depicted in Fig. 5, the logic to control the
clocking and reset of all the latches is added. Each latch
is controlled with two key bits. The four resulting states
correspond to a clear buffer, a positive phase latch, a negative
phase latch, and a constant logic 0. The truth table for the
logic is shown in Table I. During timing optimization and
analysis, this logic is constrained to the correct key setting
so the tool can target proper function. To verify the locking
process did not corrupt the functionality, the correct key is fixed
and a sequential equivalence check between the modified and
original design is run. Additionally, timing-annotated functional
simulations can provide further assurance that the timing
constraints have been properly specified.
D. Design for Testability
A primary concern when developing an IC is testability.
Design flows typically employ scan-based flops to serially load
test vectors into the circuit; however, this design for testability
(DFT) mechanism is not directly compatible with a latch-
based design. In order to maintain test coverage of our locked
circuits, we utilize scannable test points inserted at every latch
in the design. Through the use of two muxes (only one on the
functional path) and a scan flip-flop, the output of each latch
can be observed and controlled to an arbitrary value, emulating
a full scan methodology. Faults in the added clock tree logic
can be covered with additional, shared observation points.
We implement this initial version of the test infrastructure
to demonstrate that the latch-based logic locking does not
significantly impact testability; the results are shown later in
Section V-C. This DFT strategy as outlined maintains low delay
impact, but sacrifices area for ease of implementation. This
strategy can be improved using known techniques explicitly
designed for latches, namely level-sensitive scan design (LSSD).
Using only a mux and an additional latch, the same test
coverage can be achieved; however, this implementation is
left for future work.
IV. ATTACKING LATCH-BASED LOGIC LOCKING
A. Key Constraints
Given the targeted attacker model, the adversary has access
to a locked netlist with timing information. Assuming a typical
design flow, the adversary can constrain the key space to rule
out scenarios wherein combinational loops or timing violations
are created. The process of forming each constraint type is
explained below.
In the latch-based logic locking insertion flow, potential
combinational loops are likely created either when converting
an original flip-flop to keyed latches or when inserting
programmable logic decoys. A potential combinational loop
exists if there is a cyclic path through the latches. The savvy
adversary can form key constraints to ensure that along each of
these cyclic paths there is at least one phase transition. These
loop breaking constraints can be found by tracing paths from
each latch back to itself, encoding that not all encountered
latches are on the same phase or at least one of the latches is
held in reset.
Similarly, the adversary can utilize netlist timing information
to rule out additional key combinations. Assuming every path
in the correct circuit meets timing and that the clock period
is known within some bound, key constraints can be created
to exclude violating configurations. The clock period can be
Fig. 6: Example path cycle delay circuit, helping create equivalence
classes for keys. The circuitry counts the number of cycle delays
along a path through the keyed latches. CC represents clock and reset
control circuitry from Table I. PH represents circuitry that determines
the phase of the corresponding latch. Population count is used to
determine the number of transitions.
estimated via analysis of unkeyed paths or directly obtained
through analysis of an oracle circuit.
As previously mentioned, the potential for cycle sharing
makes timing latches significantly more flexible than flip-flops.
Ruling out guaranteed incorrect keys can be done using the
maximum amount of cycle sharing which limits the propagation
delay through any contiguous set of latches on the same
phase to at most the clock period, tperiod. Additionally, the
propagation delay through any contiguous set of latches with
only 1 transition in phase is limited to 1.5 × tperiod. These
constraints are generated considering every path containing a
latch. Along each such path, every delay window of length
tperiod and 1.5× tperiod is constrained to have at least 1 and
2 transitions respectively.
B. Key Equivalence Conditions
As previously mentioned, critical to the success of model
checker-based attacks is grouping functionally equivalent keys.
This entails deriving a function that maps a given key to a
point in the circuit’s functionality space. Once this function
is established, if a particular key’s functionality can be ruled
out, all other keys mapping to the same functionality can be
ruled out as well. This function is used in the termination
condition of the model checker-based attack. In latch-based
logic locking, there are two forms of programming functionality:
programmable cycle delay and programmable logic; both must
be considered to properly determine key equivalence. (The
propagation delay is also modified, but the potential timing
violations this causes can be considered separately.)
Programmable cycle delay is closely related to the process
of retiming which moves registers through combinational logic
while maintaining functionality. If two circuits with the same
combinational logic are retimings of each other, than they are
equivalent. Equivalence conditions can be established using
a result borrowed from circuit retiming. The authors in [22],
[27] establish that any retimed circuit will have equal cycle
delays along any path through the logic. Likewise, equivalent
functionalities of a design with programmable cycle delays
will maintain this same relationship.
This relationship can be encoded into a function by creating
a cycle delay counting circuit as shown in Fig. 6. The circuit
consists of logic to determine the phase of each latch within the
design (PH) and logic to count the number of phase transitions.
The PH logic outputs either positive phase, negative phase,
or feeds though the upstream latch’s phase depending on the
key. The number of latch phase transitions is calculated using
a population count circuit. A cycle delay counting circuit is
built for all paths originating in the unmodified portion of the
design tracing through the latches and for any path from a
latch back to itself.
Additionally, latch-based logic locking can change logic
functionality by holding a latch’s reset pin, creating a constant
logic 0 on the output. Different logic functionalities can be
detected with a combinational equivalence check of the logic
fanning into each latch that is not held clear or at reset. Whereas
the previous equivalence condition checks that the data flows
through the logic at equivalent rates, this equivalence condition
determines that the functionality of the logic is the same.
These two equivalence conditions are merged to form a
function that maps each key to a specific functionality. The
resulting circuits from two different keys can be determined to
be equivalent in the following manner. Every path must have
the same cycle delay count or be broken by a reset latch in
both circuits. Additionally, the input function to every output,
flip-flip, or latch not held at reset or clear must be the same.
C. Incompatible Reset Assumptions of Previous Attacks
If the attacker has access to an oracle circuit, the previously
established key constraints and equivalence conditions can be
integrated into a model checker-based attack. In describing
such an attack we must first address an incompatibility with
model checker-based attacks from previous works [16], [17].
The issue stems from the assumption that a circuit’s state is
able to be reset to a potentially unknown, but fixed value.
In many circuits this assumption is untrue. As a matter of
fact, IC designers frequently include flip-flops with no reset in
their designs to save both area and power. Often only a core
portion of sequential elements are set to a fixed state during
reset, leaving other sequential elements in unknown states. The
sequential elements that are uninitialized will eventually be set
to a known state during the circuit’s operation. Examples of
this behavior include the register file of many processors or
the datapath registers of AES.
Previous attacks use this fixed reset assumption to repeatedly
find differentiating input sequences starting from the reset state.
If this assumption is violated, the learned IO relationships will
be corrupted because of their dependence on unfixed, unmod-
eled variables. Since many circuits violate this assumption
and latch-based logic locking adds state that potentially has
an unfixed reset, we generalize the attack to account for this
behavior.
Fig. 7: (a) Miter circuit used in our modified model checker-based
attack. The free variables of the system are the two key inputs, the
initial state of all latches, and the inputs at every unrolled cycle. The
circuit is unrolled by connecting the input of each state element from
a cycle to the output of the same state element of the next cycle. (b)
Addition of a learned IO constraint to the miter circuit. In this case,
the inputs of the first two cycles are no longer free variables.
Circuit FFs Gates Frequency(GHz)
IIR 650 6308 0.79
FIR 568 6854 0.88
DES3 135 3023 1.42
AES 530 12088 1.79
OR1200 3942 20252 0.77
s9234 145 902 2.27
s13207 597 2368 1.78
s15850 513 2691 1.56
TABLE II: Characteristics of each considered benchmark circuit
D. Model Checker-Based Attack with Non-Deterministic Reset
The generalized model checker-based attack utilizes an
iteratively unrolled miter circuit as depicted in Fig. 7a. The
circuit’s free variables are the separate key inputs, shared inputs,
and shared the initial state. The key constraints and equivalence
functions are instantiated along with the miter circuit such
that the circuits produced by K0 and K1 do not have paths
that explicitly violate timing, do not contain combinational
loops, and have different functionalities. The first cycle input
is constrained such that reset is active; in subsequent cycles,
the tool is free to control reset. The model checker is given the
task of finding an input sequence that satisfies the miter circuit,
thereby producing a DIS. The tool searches for the sequence,
unrolling the circuit as needed. Since the latches operate on
both phases of the clock, every clock cycle is modeled with
two copies of the circuit.
Once a DIS is found, the oracle is used to find the correct
output. The input sequence is run on the oracle, capturing the
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Fig. 8: Enumeration of keys that satisfy timing and combinational
loop breaking constraints
output and holding the clock steady on the last cycle. The
produced IO relationship is encoded as a constraint on the
miter circuit as depicted in Fig. 7b. Now, satisfying the miter
circuit entails finding two keys and an initial state that agree
with the learned IO sequence thus far as well as extending the
input sequence to distinguish additional keys. Since the state
of the system is maintained between DISs, one contiguous
IO relationship is formed, avoiding the issues with previous
attacks.
After every newly encoded IO constraint, a termination check
is run. Using a model checker run bounded to the length of
the IO sequence thus far, the tool attempts to find two keys
and initial state that agree with the IO sequence, meet the key
constraints, and are functionally different. If the tool cannot find
two such keys, the attack terminates. Otherwise this process is
repeated, extending the length of unrolling.
This attack creates a circuit that generates functionally
correct key, initial state pairs. However, the initial state of
the system cannot be directly set, since it is determined by
the random settling of the state elements. The generated key
is only guaranteed to have correct IO behavior when paired
with its specific initial state, thus when applied to the circuit
it may produce spurious behavior. To avoid this, an attacker
attempting to overproduce the design, can modify the reset
sequence to explicitly set the initial state.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We demonstrate the attack resistance and design overheads
associated with latch-based logic locking on two sets of
open source circuits: the Common Evaluation Platform and
ISCAS89 benchmarks. All circuits were synthesized using a
modern commercial standard cell library in a 22nm process.
The characteristics of each design are displayed in Table II.
As the latch-based logic locking insertion has an element
of randomness depending on the inserted decoy logic, all
experiments are run with 5 samples per circuit, bit-count pair.
We target a 50% decoy latch to real latch ratio, however the
Fig. 9: GDSII view of the taped out circuits. (Left) From top to
bottom: FIR, IIR, DES3, AES; from left to right: original, 32 bits, 64
bits, 128 bits, 256 bits. (Right) Block view of IIR locked with 256
bits
actual value depends on the circuit due to the variability of
the retiming process.
For modifying the netlists and synthesis, we used Cadence
Genus. For place and route runs, we used Cadence Innovus.
All synthesis and place and route runs target the maximum
obtainable frequency. For assessing ATPG overheads, we
use Mentor Fastscan. Finally, for the model checker based
attack, we use Cadence JasperGold. All attacks are run with
parallelization enabled on a server with 750 GB RAM and 16
2.1GHz cores. JasperGold dynamically optimizes the execution
strategy (e.g., number of parallel threads, solver type, and
memory allocation) depending on the problem.
A. Attack Results
We first assess the impact of constraining the key space
with the combinational loop breaking and timing constraints.
We generate the constraint functions, sweeping the number of
key bits from 8 to 20. Then, we count the number of keys
that satisfy each constraint function. In Fig. 8, we plot the
counts of both types of constraints as well as the counts of
keys in the intersection of the constraints. The resulting trend
clearly demonstrates that the portion of the keys ruled out by
the constraints is minimal, with the valid key count remaining
exponential in the number of bits.
Next, we run the model checker-based attack on each circuit,
sweeping the number of key bits from 8 to 32. Past 32 bits
of obfuscation, we begin to see failures in the equivalence
function generation as a result of the exponential number of
paths that must be constrained. The attack is run with an initial
timeout of 4 hours. The average execution time, t¯exec (s), and
number of timeouts, Ntmo, are reported in Table III. To validate
the key returned by the attack, we fix one miter key input to
the correct value while setting the other key input and initial
state to the values returned by the attack. An unbounded model
check is run to verify the miter cannot be satisfied. Fixing each
key significantly reduces the state space and the tool is able
to determine sequential equivalence.
Attack runs that timeout have remaining non-equivalent keys,
validated by the sequential equivalence check. At 32 bits, only
2 instances out of 40, one FIR and one IIR circuit, do not
timeout. The exact scaling is not evident from the data as
8 bits 12 bits 16 bits 20 bits 24 bits 28 bits 32 bits
Circuit t¯exec Ntmo t¯exec Ntmo t¯exec Ntmo t¯exec Ntmo t¯exec Ntmo t¯exec Ntmo t¯exec Ntmo
DES3 2919 1 2915 1 3039 1 8809 3 8902 3 8857 3 - 5
FIR 176 0 157 0 5915 2 3078 1 5932 2 9061 3 11590 4
IIR 789 0 349 0 3245 1 4820 1 3268 1 6172 2 11627 4
AES 2308 0 270 0 6051 2 6223 2 11764 4 8941 3 - 5
OR1200 12603 4 12839 4 - 5 - 5 - 5 - 5 - 5
s9234 - 5 12115 4 - 5 11834 4 11742 4 11841 4 - 5
s13207 11713 4 9055 3 11883 4 12545 4 - 5 - 5 - 5
s15850 6316 2 - 5 - 5 - 5 - 5 - 5 - 5
TABLE III: Model checker-based attack average execution times, t¯exec (s), and number of timed out runs, Ntmo, from 5 iterations.
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Fig. 10: Delay, power, and area overheads of latch-based logic locking normalized to the original design. The results are shown with and
without scan chain logic colored orange and blue respectively. Place and route results (n=1) are shown for DES3, FIR, IIR, and AES in green.
the timeout clips the true average values. However, we have
run many attacks past the 24 hour mark and do not observe
convergence in any additional circuits. The attack seems limited
by the state space explosion. For example, we see that in 24
hours the model checker is only able to fully explore just
13 cycles of the AES circuit. It should be noted that this is
just the lower bound as JasperGold utilizes several parallel
execution engines attempting to find traces both at the current
cycle bound, but also well beyond it. The lack of termination
suggests that differences in behavior that are buried deep in
the FSM are unlikely to be discovered. Thus, these results
show resistance to this attack with a low number of key bits.
The results also suggest circuit regularity may impact attack
performance. OR1200, s9234, s13207, and s15850 are less
regular compared to FIR, IIR, AES, and DES3 and show
greater attack strength with most instances of these circuits
timing out even with as few as 12 bits.
Under the returned keys, timing violations are likely to
remain from incorrect propagation delays. The keys that are
ruled out via the timing constraints are just the keys that will
violate timing under any possible cycle sharing. After running
the model checker-based attack, the adversary must still find a
key that passes timing. This can be done though recombining
the latches into flip-flops and retiming. Additionally, the key
must be combined with the final state of the attack to guarantee
matching functionality. Keys applied without changing the
initial state may still produce incorrect behavior; assigning the
respective initial state will force the circuit to the part of the
FSM that matches the oracle.
B. Power, Performance, Area Overhead
We obtain power, performance, and area (PPA) overheads as
follows. First, the maximum frequency of the design is found
via a synthesis run targeting an unattainably high frequency.
The synthesis tool produces a critical path that determines the
maximum frequency, but with excessive buffering. The synthe-
sis process is then rerun from scratch targeting this maximum
frequency. This result serves as the baseline implementation to
which various amounts of locking are applied and to which the
results are normalized. Each circuit’s baseline is keyed with 32,
64, 128, and 256 bits of latch-based logic locking, targeting
the same maximum frequency. The resulting overheads are
designated by the blue bars in Fig. 10. Additionally, we assess
the overhead after scan chains and test points have been
inserted; these results are normalized to the baseline design
with full scan, and shown in orange. Finally, for a subset of
the circuits (FIR, IIR, DES3, AES), we have taken the designs
through place and route, submitting them for fabrication. The
top level diagram of the taped out IC and a block view of one
circuit are shown in Fig. 9. We report results from taped out
place and route runs in green.
Without DFT, we see virtually no impact on delay or
power. At 256 bits the average overheads are 1.8%, 2.5%, and
24.1% for delay, power, and area respectively. Adding DFT,
results in a slight increase in the delay and power overheads
along with a significant jump in area cost. Now the average
overheads at 256 bits are 5.0%, 8.3%, and 61.7% respectively.
As previously noted, this area overhead will be significantly
reduced when using LSSD techniques as opposed to the current
over abundance of area-expensive test points. Reducing the area
overhead will also likely reduce the power and delay overheads
as the length of routes should decrease. The place and route
overheads remain largely consistent with the synthesis data.
One notable difference is an increase in power of DES3. This
is a result of the clock tree’s power being included after place
and route. While not a significant change for other circuits,
since DES3 has a smaller proportion of flip-flops, the impact
of many nodes switching with an activity factor of 1 is greater.
In general there exists a good balance between the benefits
of cycle sharing from replacing original flip-flops with latches,
and the added delays from inserting decoys. These results show
that the amount of locking can be greatly increased before
significant overhead costs are observed.
C. Testing Overhead
Next, we analyze the impact of latch-based logic locking
on single stuck line (SSL) fault coverage. For all circuits,
we run ATPG to generate tests for all SSL faults. The
resulting coverages, normalized to the original circuit with
full scan, are displayed in Fig. 11. We see an average coverage
reduction of 0.2%, 0.3%, 0.5% and 0.5% for 32, 64, 128, and
256 bits, respectively. Across all designs and iterations we
see a worst case reduction of 1.2%. Assuming that design
security is a top priority, these coverage overheads are likely
acceptable. Furthermore, inspecting the remaining faults reveals
a significant portion of the remaining faults are located along
the modified clock path to the latches. Thus higher coverages
are likely obtainable using the same DFT techniques used in
clock gating.
VI. DISCUSSION
As we have demonstrated, latch-based logic locking is
resistant to current model checker-based attacks and the low
overhead allows the amount of obfuscation to be increased
significantly without performance loss. A key aspect of this
security results from the state space explosion in which every
cycle of unrolling increases the number of possible vectors
by factor of 2inputs. Any successful attack must handle this
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Fig. 11: Normalized SSL test coverage for circuits locked with latch-
based logic locking
problem and potential improvements to latch-based logic
locking may exacerbate it.
As seen from previous locking techniques, improved attack
modeling can significantly reduce the difficulty of deobfusca-
tion. While we have modeled our technique with significant
detail, better equivalence models and constraints may exist. One
solution to this threat is to increase the difficulty in modeling
through the violation of typical design constraints. In this paper
we consider two key constraints, timing and combinational
loop breaking. Explicitly breaking these assumptions by adding
timing violations or combinational loops in the correct design
will reduce the number of keys that can be ruled out and make
forming each constraint significantly more complex. Another
method of increasing modeling complexity is combining latch-
based logic locking with other logic locking schemes, forcing
the attacker to understand and model multiple interacting circuit
transformations.
Additionally, the best structure and insertion technique for
decoy logic has yet to be determined. Our current method,
randomly forming logic cones from existing signals, does not
add significant signal skew. Ideally this property would be
kept, maintaining low traceability, while also increasing the
hardness of SAT deobfuscation. We leave this and the preceding
directions for future work.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we have introduced Latch-Based Logic Locking,
a novel technique that obstructs IP theft. By manipulating the
flow of data and inserting additional logic without effecting the
critical paths of a design, this scheme is able to produce designs
with both minimal overhead and strong attack resistance. Fur-
thermore, this technique is compatible with industry standard
tools. We have demonstrated these properties by constructing
a locking flow and taking it through tape out, presenting the
overhead on realistic circuits, and executing a state-of-the-art
attack algorithm.
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